ПЕНТАГОН 911 загадки и ответы (фото... много)

хехе
тебе пора уже очередную клоунскую штуку откалывать
а то становится скушновато

Ну отваливай из этой темы, тем более тебя в неё никто не звал.
Создай свою и гадь в ней всем кому захочешь :-D

хыхы
ждем очередное фото
Пора, пора уже оторвать от лыковых лаптей, кожанные подметки.

[Сообщение изменено пользователем 10.07.2008 19:14]

THE 9/11
COMMISSION
REPORT
Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States
executive summary

COMMISSION
MEMBERS
Thomas H. Kean
chair
Richard Ben-Veniste
Fred F. Fielding
Jamie S. Gorelick
Slade Gorton
Lee H. Hamilton
vice chair
Bob Kerrey John F. Lehman
Timothy J. Roemer
James R.Thompson

COMMISSION
STAFF
Philip Zelikow, Executive Director
Christopher A. Kojm, Deputy Executive Director
Daniel Marcus, General Counsel
Joanne M.Accolla
Staff Assistant
Alexis Albion
Professional Staff Member
Scott H.Allan,Jr.
Counsel
John A.Azzarello
Counsel
Caroline Barnes
Professional Staff Member
Warren Bass
Professional Staff Member
Ann M. Bennett
Information Control Officer
Mark S. Bittinger
Professional Staff Member
Madeleine Blot
Counsel
Antwion M. Blount
Systems Engineer
Sam Brinkley
Professional Staff Member
Geoffrey Scott Brown
Research Assistant
Daniel Byman
Professional Staff Member
Dianna Campagna
Manager of Operations
Samuel M.W.Caspersen
Counsel
Melissa A. Coffey
Staff Assistant
Lance Cole
Consultant
Marquittia L. Coleman
Staff Assistant
Marco A. Cordero
Professional Staff Member
Rajesh De
Counsel
George W.Delgrosso
Investigator
Gerald L. Dillingham
Professional Staff Member
Thomas E. Dowling
Professional Staff Member
Steven M. Dunne
Deputy General Counsel
Thomas R. Eldridge
Counsel
Alice Falk
Editor
John J. Farmer, Jr.
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
Alvin S. Felzenberg
Deputy for Communications
COMMISSION STAFF
Lorry M. Fenner
Professional Staff Member
Susan Ginsburg
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
T. Graham Giusti
Security Officer
Nicole Marie Grandrimo
Professional Staff Member
Douglas N. Greenburg
Counsel
Barbara A. Grewe
Senior Counsel, Special Projects
Elinore Flynn Hartz
Family Liaison
Leonard R. Hawley
Professional Staff Member
L. Christine Healey
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
Karen Heitkotter
Executive Secretary
Walter T. Hempel II
Professional Staff Member
C. Michael Hurley
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
Dana J. Hyde
Counsel
John W.Ivicic
Security Officer
Michael N. Jacobson
Counsel
Hunter W.Jamerson
Intern
Bonnie D. Jenkins
Counsel
Reginald F. Johnson
Staff Assistant
R.William Johnstone
Professional Staff Member
Stephanie L. Kaplan
Special Assistant & Managing Editor
Miles L. Kara, Sr.
Professional Staff Member
Janice L. Kephart
Counsel
Hyon Kim
Counsel
Katarzyna Kozaczuk
Financial Assistant
Gordon Nathaniel Lederman
Counsel
Daniel J. Leopold
Staff Assistant
Sarah Webb Linden
Professional Staff Member
Douglas J. MacEachin
Professional Staff Member & Team Leader
Ernest R. May
Senior Adviser
Joseph McBride
Intern
James Miller
Professional Staff Member
Kelly Moore
Professional Staff Member
Charles M. Pereira
Professional Staff Member
John Raidt
Professional Staff Member
John Roth
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
Peter Rundlet
Counsel
Lloyd D. Salvetti
Professional Staff Member
Kevin J. Scheid
Professional Staff Member & Team Leader
Kevin Shaeffer
Professional Staff Member
Tracy J. Shycoff
Deputy for Administration & Finance
Dietrich L. Snell
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
Jonathan DeWees Stull
Communications Assistant
Lisa Marie Sullivan
Staff Assistant
Quinn John Tamm, Jr.
Professional Staff Member
Catharine S.Taylor
Staff Assistant
Yoel Tobin
Counsel
Emily Landis Walker
Professional Staff Member & Family Liaison
Garth Wermter
Senior IT Consultant
Serena B.Wille
Counsel
Peter Yerkes
Public Affairs Assistant
THE 9/11
COMMISSION
REPORT
executive summary

EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
We present the narrative of this report and the recommendations that flow from it to the President of the United States, the United States Congress, and the American people for their consideration. Ten Commissioners—five Republicans and five Democrats chosen by elected leaders from our nation’s capital at a time of great partisan division—have come together to present this report without dissent.
We have come together with a unity of purpose because our nation demands it. September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the United States.The nation was unprepared.
A NATION TRANSFORMED
At 8:46 on the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States became a nation transformed.
An airliner traveling at hundreds of miles per hour and carrying some 10,000 gallons of jet fuel plowed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan. At 9:03, a second airliner hit the South Tower. Fire and smoke billowed upward.Steel,glass,ash,and bodies fell below.The Twin Towers, where up to 50,000 people worked each day, both collapsed less than 90 minutes
later.
At 9:37 that same morning, a third airliner slammed into the western face of the Pentagon. At 10:03, a fourth airliner crashed in a field in southern Pennsylvania. It had been aimed at the United States Capitol or the White House, and was forced down by heroic passengers armed with the knowledge that America was under attack.
More than 2,600 people died at the World Trade Center; 125 died at the
2 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes. The death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
This immeasurable pain was inflicted by 19 young Arabs acting at the behest of Islamist extremists headquartered in distant Afghanistan. Some had been in the United States for more than a year, mixing with the rest of the population. Though four had training as pilots, most were not well-educated. Most spoke English poorly, some hardly at all. In groups of four or five, carrying with them only small knives, box cutters, and cans of Mace or pepper spray, they had hijacked the four planes and turned them into deadly guided missiles.
Why did they do this? How was the attack planned and conceived? How did the U.S. government fail to anticipate and prevent it? What can we do in the future to prevent similar acts of terrorism?
A Shock, Not a Surprise
The 9/11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise. Islamist extremists had given plenty of warning that they meant to kill Americans indiscriminately and in large numbers. Although Usama Bin Ladin himself would not emerge as a signal threat until the late 1990s, the threat of Islamist terrorism grew over the decade.
In February 1993, a group led by Ramzi Yousef tried to bring down the World Trade Center with a truck bomb.They killed six and wounded a thou-sand. Plans by Omar Abdel Rahman and others to blow up the Holland and Lincoln tunnels and other New York City landmarks were frustrated when the plotters were arrested. In October 1993, Somali tribesmen shot down U.S. helicopters,
killing 18 and wounding 73 in an incident that came to be known as “Black Hawk down.”Years later it would be learned that those Somali tribes-men had received help from al Qaeda.
In early 1995, police in Manila uncovered a plot by Ramzi Yousef to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners while they were flying over the Pacific. In November 1995, a car bomb exploded outside the office of the U.S. program manager for the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh, killing five Americans and two others. In June 1996, a truck bomb demolished the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. servicemen and wounding hundreds.The attack was carried out primarily by Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that had received help from the government of Iran.
Until 1997, the U.S. intelligence community viewed Bin Ladin as a financier
of terrorism, not as a terrorist leader. In February 1998, Usama Bin Ladin and four others issued a self-styled fatwa, publicly declaring that it was God’s decree that every Muslim should try his utmost to kill any American, military or civilian, anywhere in the world, because of American “occupa-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
tion” of Islam’s holy places and aggression against Muslims.
In August 1998, Bin Ladin’s group, al Qaeda, carried out near-simultaneous truck bomb attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.The attacks killed 224 people,including 12 Americans,and wounded thousands more.
In December 1999, Jordanian police foiled a plot to bomb hotels and other sites frequented by American tourists, and a U.S. Customs agent arrested Ahmed Ressam at the U.S. Canadian border as he was smuggling in explosives intended
for an attack on Los Angeles International Airport.
In October 2000, an al Qaeda team in Aden,Yemen, used a motorboat filled with explosives to blow a hole in the side of a destroyer, the USS Cole, almost sinking the vessel and killing 17 American sailors.
The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were far more elaborate, precise, and destructive than any of these earlier assaults. But by September 2001, the executive branch of the U.S. government, the Congress, the news media, and the American public had received clear warning that Islamist terrorists meant to kill Americans in high numbers.
Who Is the Enemy?
Who is this enemy that created an organization capable of inflicting such horrific
damage on the United States? We now know that these attacks were carried
out by various groups of Islamist extremists.The 9/11 attack was driven by Usama Bin Ladin.
In the 1980s, young Muslims from around the world went to Afghanistan to join as volunteers in a jihad (or holy struggle) against the Soviet Union. A wealthy Saudi, Usama Bin Ladin, was one of them. Following the defeat of the Soviets in the late 1980s, Bin Ladin and others formed al Qaeda to mobilize jihads elsewhere.
The history, culture, and body of beliefs from which Bin Ladin shapes and spreads his message are largely unknown to many Americans. Seizing on symbols
of Islam’s past greatness, he promises to restore pride to people who consider
themselves the victims of successive foreign masters. He uses cultural and religious allusions to the holy Qur’an and some of its interpreters. He appeals to people disoriented by cyclonic change as they confront modernity and globalization.
His rhetoric selectively draws from multiple sources—Islam, history, and the region’s political and economic malaise.
Bin Ladin also stresses grievances against the United States widely shared in the Muslim world. He inveighed against the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, which is the home of Islam’s holiest sites, and against other U.S. policies in the Middle East.
4 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Upon this political and ideological foundation, Bin Ladin built over the course of a decade a dynamic and lethal organization. He built an infrastructure and organization in Afghanistan that could attract, train, and use recruits against ever more ambitious targets. He rallied new zealots and new money with each demonstration of al Qaeda’s capability. He had forged a close alliance with the Taliban, a regime providing sanctuary for al Qaeda.
By September 11, 2001, al Qaeda possessed
• leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction
of a major operation;
• a personnel system that could recruit candidates, indoctrinate them, vet them, and give them the necessary training;
• communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of operatives
and those who would be helping them;
• an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments
of enemy strengths and weaknesses;
• the ability to move people great distances; and
• the ability to raise and move the money necessary to finance an attack.
1998 to September 11, 2001
The August 1998 bombings of U.S.embassies in Kenya and Tanzania established al Qaeda as a potent adversary of the United States.
After launching cruise missile strikes against al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation for the embassy bombings, the Clinton administration applied diplomatic pressure to try to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to expel Bin Ladin. The administration also devised covert operations to use CIA-paid foreign agents to capture or kill Bin Ladin and his chief lieutenants. These actions did not stop Bin Ladin or dislodge al Qaeda from its sanctuary.
By late 1998 or early 1999, Bin Ladin and his advisers had agreed on an idea brought to them by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) called the “planes operation.”
It would eventually culminate in the 9/11 attacks. Bin Ladin and his chief of operations, Mohammed Atef, occupied undisputed leadership positions atop al Qaeda.Within al Qaeda,they relied heavily on the ideas and enterprise of strong-willed field commanders, such as KSM, to carry out worldwide terrorist
operations.
KSM claims that his original plot was even grander than those carried out on 9/11—ten planes would attack targets on both the East and West coasts of the United States.This plan was modified by Bin Ladin, KSM said, owing to its scale and complexity. Bin Ladin provided KSM with four initial operatives for suicide plane attacks within the United States, and in the fall of 1999 training
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
for the attacks began. New recruits included four from a cell of expatriate Muslim extremists who had clustered together in Hamburg, Germany. One became the tactical commander of the operation in the United States: Mohamed Atta.
U.S. intelligence frequently picked up reports of attacks planned by al Qaeda. Working with foreign security services, the CIA broke up some al Qaeda cells. The core of Bin Ladin’s organization nevertheless remained intact. In December 1999, news about the arrests of the terrorist cell in Jordan and the arrest of a terrorist at the U.S.-Canadian border became part of a “millennium alert.”The government was galvanized, and the public was on alert for any possible attack.
In January 2000, the intense intelligence effort glimpsed and then lost sight of two operatives destined for the “planes operation.” Spotted in Kuala Lumpur, the pair were lost passing through Bangkok. On January 15, 2000, they arrived in Los Angeles.
Because these two al Qaeda operatives had spent little time in the West and spoke little, if any, English, it is plausible that they or KSM would have tried to identify,in advance,a friendly contact in the United States.We explored suspicions
about whether these two operatives had a support network of accomplices in the United States. The evidence is thin—simply not there for some cases, more worrisome in others.
We do know that soon after arriving in California, the two al Qaeda operatives
sought out and found a group of ideologically like-minded Muslims with roots in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, individuals mainly associated with a young Yemeni and others who attended a mosque in San Diego. After a brief stay in Los Angeles about which we know little, the al Qaeda operatives lived openly in San Diego under their true names.They managed to avoid attracting much attention.
By the summer of 2000, three of the four Hamburg cell members had arrived on the East Coast of the United States and had begun pilot training. In early 2001, a fourth future hijacker pilot, Hani Hanjour, journeyed to Arizona with another operative, Nawaf al Hazmi, and conducted his refresher pilot training
there. A number of al Qaeda operatives had spent time in Arizona during the 1980s and early 1990s.
During 2000, President Bill Clinton and his advisers renewed diplomatic efforts to get Bin Ladin expelled from Afghanistan. They also renewed secret efforts with some of the Taliban’s opponents—the Northern Alliance—to get enough intelligence to attack Bin Ladin directly. Diplomatic efforts centered on the new military government in Pakistan, and they did not succeed.The efforts with the Northern Alliance revived an inconclusive and secret debate about whether the United States should take sides in Afghanistan’s civil war and sup-
6 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
port the Taliban’s enemies. The CIA also produced a plan to improve intelligence
collection on al Qaeda, including the use of a small, unmanned airplane with a video camera, known as the Predator.
After the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, evidence accumulated that it had been launched by al Qaeda operatives, but without confirmation that Bin Ladin had given the order.The Taliban had earlier been warned that it would be held responsible for another Bin Ladin attack on the United States.The CIA described its findings as a “preliminary judgment”; President Clinton and his chief advisers told us they were waiting for a conclusion before deciding whether to take military action.The military alternatives remained unappealing to them.
The transition to the new Bush administration in late 2000 and early 2001 took place with the Cole issue still pending. President George W. Bush and his chief advisers accepted that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack on the Cole, but did not like the options available for a response.
Bin Ladin’s inference may well have been that attacks, at least at the level of the Cole, were risk free.
The Bush administration began developing a new strategy with the stated goal of eliminating the al Qaeda threat within three to five years.
During the spring and summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies received a stream of warnings that al Qaeda planned, as one report put it, “something very,very,very big.”Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told us,“The system was blinking red.”
Although Bin Ladin was determined to strike in the United States, as President Clinton had been told and President Bush was reminded in a Presidential Daily Brief article briefed to him in August 2001, the specific threat information pointed overseas. Numerous precautions were taken overseas. Domestic agencies were not effectively mobilized. The threat did not receive national media attention comparable to the millennium alert.
While the United States continued disruption efforts around the world, its emerging strategy to eliminate the al Qaeda threat was to include an enlarged covert action program in Afghanistan, as well as diplomatic strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan.The process culminated during the summer of 2001 in a draft presidential directive and arguments about the Predator aircraft, which was soon to be deployed with a missile of its own, so that it might be used to attempt to kill Bin Ladin or his chief lieutenants. At a September 4 meeting, President Bush’s chief advisers approved the draft directive of the strategy and endorsed the concept of arming the Predator. This directive on the al Qaeda strategy was awaiting President Bush’s signature on September 11, 2001.
Though the “planes operation” was progressing, the plotters had problems of
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7
their own in 2001.Several possible participants dropped out;others could not gain entry into the United States (including one denial at a port of entry and visa denials not related to terrorism). One of the eventual pilots may have considered abandoning the planes operation. Zacarias Moussaoui, who showed up at a flight training school in Minnesota, may have been a candidate to replace him.
Some of the vulnerabilities of the plotters become clear in retrospect. Moussaoui aroused suspicion for seeking fast-track training on how to pilot large jet airliners. He was arrested on August 16, 2001, for violations of immigration
regulations. In late August, officials in the intelligence community realized
that the terrorists spotted in Southeast Asia in January 2000 had arrived in the United States.
These cases did not prompt urgent action. No one working on these late leads in the summer of 2001 connected them to the high level of threat reporting.
In the words of one official, no analytic work foresaw the lightning that could connect the thundercloud to the ground.
As final preparations were under way during the summer of 2001, dissent emerged among al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan over whether to proceed. The Taliban’s chief, Mullah Omar, opposed attacking the United States. Although facing opposition from many of his senior lieutenants, Bin Ladin effectively overruled their objections, and the attacks went forward.
September 11, 2001
The day began with the 19 hijackers getting through a security checkpoint system
that they had evidently analyzed and knew how to defeat.Their success rate in penetrating the system was 19 for 19.They took over the four flights, taking advantage of air crews and cockpits that were not prepared for the contingency of a suicide hijacking.
On 9/11, the defense of U.S. air space depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Existing protocols on 9/11 were unsuited in every respect for an attack in which hijacked planes were used as weapons.
What ensued was a hurried attempt to improvise a defense by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military
unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction.
A shootdown authorization was not communicated to the NORAD air defense sector until 28 minutes after United 93 had crashed in Pennsylvania. Planes were scrambled, but ineffectively, as they did not know where to go or what targets they were to intercept.And once the shootdown order was given,
8 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
it was not communicated to the pilots. In short, while leaders in Washington believed that the fighters circling above them had been instructed to “take out” hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to “ID type and tail.”
Like the national defense, the emergency response on 9/11 was necessarily improvised.
In New York City, the Fire Department of New York, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the building employees, and the occupants of the buildings did their best to cope with the effects of almost unimaginable events—unfolding furiously over 102 minutes. Casualties were nearly 100 percent at and above the impact zones and were very high among first responders who stayed in danger
as they tried to save lives. Despite weaknesses in preparations for disaster,
failure to achieve unified incident command, and inadequate communications
among responding agencies, all but approximately one hundred of the thousands of civilians who worked below the impact zone escaped, often with help from the emergency responders.
At the Pentagon, while there were also problems of command and control, the emergency response was generally effective. The Incident Command System, a formalized management structure for emergency response in place in the National Capital Region, overcame the inherent complications of a response across local, state, and federal jurisdictions.
Operational Opportunities
We write with the benefit and handicap of hindsight. We are mindful of the danger of being unjust to men and women who made choices in conditions of uncertainty and in circumstances over which they often had little control.
Nonetheless, there were specific points of vulnerability in the plot and opportunities to disrupt it. Operational failures—opportunities that were not or could not be exploited by the organizations and systems of that time—included
• not watchlisting future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar, not trailing them after they traveled to Bangkok, and not informing the FBI about one future hijacker’s U.S. visa or his companion’s travel to the United States;
• not sharing information linking individuals in the Cole attack to Mihdhar;
• not taking adequate steps in time to find Mihdhar or Hazmi in the United States;
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9
• not linking the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, described as interested in flight training for the purpose of using an airplane in a terrorist act, to the heightened indications of attack;
• not discovering false statements on visa applications;
• not recognizing passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner;
• not expanding no-fly lists to include names from terrorist watchlists;
• not searching airline passengers identified by the computer-based CAPPS screening system; and
• not hardening aircraft cockpit doors or taking other measures to pre-pare for the possibility of suicide hijackings.
GENERAL FINDINGS
Since the plotters were flexible and resourceful, we cannot know whether any single step or series of steps would have defeated them.What we can say with confidence is that none of the measures adopted by the U.S. government
from 1998 to 2001 disturbed or even delayed the progress of the al Qaeda plot.Across the government,there were failures of imagination,pol-icy, capabilities, and management.
Imagination
The most important failure was one of imagination.We do not believe leaders
understood the gravity of the threat.The terrorist danger from Bin Ladin and al Qaeda was not a major topic for policy debate among the public, the media, or in the Congress. Indeed, it barely came up during the 2000 presidential
campaign.
Al Qaeda’s new brand of terrorism presented challenges to U.S. governmental
institutions that they were not well-designed to meet.Though top officials all told us that they understood the danger, we believe there was uncertainty among them as to whether this was just a new and especially venomous version of the ordinary terrorist threat the United States had lived with for decades, or it was indeed radically new, posing a threat beyond any yet experienced.
As late as September 4, 2001, Richard Clarke, the White House staffer long responsible for counterterrorism policy coordination, asserted that the government
had not yet made up its mind how to answer the question:“Is al Qida a big deal?”
A week later came the answer.
10 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Policy
Terrorism was not the overriding national security concern for the U.S. government
under either the Clinton or the pre-9/11 Bush administration.
The policy challenges were linked to this failure of imagination. Officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations regarded a full U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as practically inconceivable before 9/11.
Capabilities
Before 9/11, the United States tried to solve the al Qaeda problem with the capabilities it had used in the last stages of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath.These capabilities were insufficient. Little was done to expand or reform them.
The CIA had minimal capacity to conduct paramilitary operations with its own personnel, and it did not seek a large-scale expansion of these capabilities before 9/11. The CIA also needed to improve its capability to collect intelligence
from human agents.
At no point before 9/11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the mission of countering al Qaeda, even though this was perhaps the most dangerous
foreign enemy threatening the United States.
America’s homeland defenders faced outward. NORAD itself was barely able to retain any alert bases at all. Its planning scenarios occasionally considered
the danger of hijacked aircraft being guided to American targets, but only aircraft that were coming from overseas.
The most serious weaknesses in agency capabilities were in the domestic arena.The FBI did not have the capability to link the collective knowledge of agents in the field to national priorities. Other domestic agencies deferred to the FBI.
FAA capabilities were weak. Any serious examination of the possibility of a suicide hijacking could have suggested changes to fix glaring vulnerabilities—
expanding no-fly lists, searching passengers identified by the CAPPS screening system, deploying federal air marshals domestically, hardening
cockpit doors, alerting air crews to a different kind of hijacking possibility
than they had been trained to expect.Yet the FAA did not adjust either its own training or training with NORAD to take account of threats other than those experienced in the past.
Management
The missed opportunities to thwart the 9/11 plot were also symptoms of a broader inability to adapt the way government manages problems to the new challenges of the twenty-first century.Action officers should have been able to
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11
draw on all available knowledge about al Qaeda in the government. Management should have ensured that information was shared and duties were clearly assigned across agencies, and across the foreign-domestic divide.
There were also broader management issues with respect to how top leaders set priorities and allocated resources. For instance, on December 4, 1998, DCI Tenet issued a directive to several CIA officials and the DDCI for Community Management, stating: “We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community.”The memorandum had little overall effect on mobilizing the CIA or the intelligence community. This episode indicates the limitations of the DCI’s authority over the direction of the intelligence community, including agencies within the Department of Defense.
The U.S. government did not find a way of pooling intelligence and using it to guide the planning and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations involving entities as disparate as the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the military, and the agencies involved in homeland security.
SPECIFIC FINDINGS
Unsuccessful Diplomacy
Beginning in February 1997, and through September 11, 2001, the U.S. government
tried to use diplomatic pressure to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to stop being a sanctuary for al Qaeda, and to expel Bin Ladin to a country where he could face justice. These efforts included warnings and sanctions, but they all failed.
The U.S. government also pressed two successive Pakistani governments to demand that the Taliban cease providing a sanctuary for Bin Ladin and his organization
and, failing that, to cut off their support for the Taliban. Before 9/11, the United States could not find a mix of incentives and pressure that would persuade
Pakistan to reconsider its fundamental relationship with the Taliban.
From 1999 through early 2001, the United States pressed the United Arab Emirates, one of the Taliban’s only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off ties and enforce sanctions, especially those related to air travel
to Afghanistan.These efforts achieved little before 9/11.
Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism. Before 9/11, the Saudi and U.S. governments did not fully share intelligence information or develop an adequate joint effort to track and disrupt the finances of the al Qaeda organization. On the other hand, government officials of Saudi Arabia at the highest levels worked closely with top U.S. officials in major initiatives
to solve the Bin Ladin problem with diplomacy.
12 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Lack of Military Options
In response to the request of policymakers, the military prepared an array of limited strike options for attacking Bin Ladin and his organization from May 1998 onward.When they briefed policymakers, the military presented both the pros and cons of those strike options and the associated risks. Policymakers expressed frustration with the range of options presented.
Following the August 20, 1998, missile strikes on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, both senior military officials and policymakers placed great emphasis on actionable intelligence as the key factor in recommending
or deciding to launch military action against Bin Ladin and his organization. They did not want to risk significant collateral damage, and they did not want to miss Bin Ladin and thus make the United States look weak while making Bin Ladin look strong. On three specific occasions in 1998–1999, intelligence was deemed credible enough to warrant planning for possible strikes to kill Bin Ladin. But in each case the strikes did not go forward, because senior policymakers did not regard the intelligence as sufficiently
actionable to offset their assessment of the risks.
The Director of Central Intelligence, policymakers, and military officials expressed frustration with the lack of actionable intelligence. Some officials inside the Pentagon, including those in the special forces and the counterterror-ism policy office, also expressed frustration with the lack of military action.The Bush administration began to develop new policies toward al Qaeda in 2001, but military plans did not change until after 9/11.
Problems within the Intelligence Community
The intelligence community struggled throughout the 1990s and up to 9/11 to collect intelligence on and analyze the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. The combination of an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries resulted in an insufficient response to this new challenge.
Many dedicated officers worked day and night for years to piece together the growing body of evidence on al Qaeda and to understand the threats.Yet, while there were many reports on Bin Laden and his growing al Qaeda organization, there was no comprehensive review of what the intelligence community knew and what it did not know, and what that meant. There was no National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism between 1995 and 9/11.
Before 9/11, no agency did more to attack al Qaeda than the CIA. But there were limits to what the CIA was able to achieve by disrupting terrorist activities
abroad and by using proxies to try to capture Bin Ladin and his lieutenants in Afghanistan. CIA officers were aware of those limitations.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13
To put it simply, covert action was not a silver bullet. It was important to engage proxies in Afghanistan and to build various capabilities so that if an opportunity presented itself, the CIA could act on it. But for more than three years, through both the late Clinton and early Bush administrations, the CIA relied on proxy forces, and there was growing frustration within the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center and in the National Security Council staff with the lack of results. The development of the Predator and the push to aid the Northern Alliance were products of this frustration.
Problems in the FBI
From the time of the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, FBI and Department of Justice leadership in Washington and NewYork became increasingly
concerned about the terrorist threat from Islamist extremists to U.S. interests,
both at home and abroad.Throughout the 1990s,the FBI’s counterterror-ism efforts against international terrorist organizations included both intelligence
and criminal investigations.The FBI’s approach to investigations was case-specific, decentralized, and geared toward prosecution. Significant FBI resources were devoted to after-the-fact investigations of major terrorist attacks, resulting in several prosecutions.
The FBI attempted several reform efforts aimed at strengthening its ability to prevent such attacks, but these reform efforts failed to implement organization-
wide institutional change. On September 11, 2001, the FBI was limited in several areas critical to an effective preventive counterterrorism strategy.Those working counterterrorism matters did so despite limited intelligence collection and strategic analysis capabilities, a limited capacity to share information both internally and externally, insufficient training, perceived legal barriers to sharing information, and inadequate resources.
Permeable Borders and Immigration Controls
There were opportunities for intelligence and law enforcement to exploit al Qaeda’s travel vulnerabilities. Considered collectively, the 9/11 hijackers
• included known al Qaeda operatives who could have been watchlisted;
• presented passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner;
• presented passports with suspicious indicators of extremism;
• made detectable false statements on visa applications;
• made false statements to border officials to gain entry into the United States; and
• violated immigration laws while in the United States.
14 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Neither the State Department’s consular officers nor the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s inspectors and agents were ever considered full partners in a national counterterrorism effort. Protecting borders was not a national security issue before 9/11.
Permeable Aviation Security
Hijackers studied publicly available materials on the aviation security system and used items that had less metal content than a handgun and were most likely
permissible.Though two of the hijackers were on the U.S.TIPOFF terrorist watchlist,the FAA did not use TIPOFF data.The hijackers had to beat only one layer of security—the security checkpoint process. Even though several hijackers
were selected for extra screening by the CAPPS system, this led only to greater scrutiny of their checked baggage. Once on board, the hijackers were faced with aircraft personnel who were trained to be nonconfrontational in the event of a hijacking.
Financing
The 9/11 attacks cost somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to execute. The operatives spent more than $270,000 in the United States. Additional expenses included travel to obtain passports and visas, travel to the United States, expenses incurred by the plot leader and facilitators outside the United States, and expenses incurred by the people selected to be hijackers who ultimately
did not participate.
The conspiracy made extensive use of banks in the United States. The hijackers opened accounts in their own names, using passports and other identification
documents. Their transactions were unremarkable and essentially invisible amid the billions of dollars flowing around the world every day.
To date, we have not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks.Al Qaeda had many sources of funding and a pre-9/11 annual budget estimated at $30 million. If a particular source of funds had dried up, al Qaeda could easily have found enough money elsewhere to fund the attack.
An Improvised Homeland Defense
The civilian and military defenders of the nation’s airspace—FAA and NORAD—were unprepared for the attacks launched against them. Given that lack of preparedness, they attempted and failed to improvise an effective home-land defense against an unprecedented challenge.
The events of that morning do not reflect discredit on operational personnel.
NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector personnel reached out for infor-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15
mation and made the best judgments they could based on the information they received. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and command center managers were creative and agile in recommending a nationwide alert, ground-stopping local traffic, ordering all aircraft nationwide to land, and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly.
At more senior levels, communication was poor. Senior military and FAA leaders had no effective communication with each other. The chain of command
did not function well. The President could not reach some senior officials.
The Secretary of Defense did not enter the chain of command until the morning’s key events were over. Air National Guard units with different rules of engagement were scrambled without the knowledge of the President, NORAD, or the National Military Command Center.
Emergency Response
The civilians, firefighters, police officers, emergency medical technicians, and emergency management professionals exhibited steady determination and resolve under horrifying, overwhelming conditions on 9/11.Their actions saved lives and inspired a nation.
Effective decisionmaking in New York was hampered by problems in command
and control and in internal communications. Within the Fire Department of New York, this was true for several reasons: the magnitude of the incident was unforeseen; commanders had difficulty communicating with their units; more units were actually dispatched than were ordered by the chiefs; some units self-dispatched; and once units arrived at the World Trade Center, they were neither comprehensively accounted for nor coordinated. The Port Authority’s response was hampered by the lack both of standard operating procedures and of radios capable of enabling multiple commands to respond to an incident in unified fashion.The New York Police Department, because of its history of mobilizing thousands of officers for major events requiring crowd control, had a technical radio capability and protocols more easily adapted to an incident of the magnitude of 9/11.
Congress
The Congress, like the executive branch, responded slowly to the rise of transnational terrorism as a threat to national security. The legislative branch adjusted little and did not restructure itself to address changing threats. Its attention
to terrorism was episodic and splintered across several committees. The Congress gave little guidance to executive branch agencies on terrorism, did not reform them in any significant way to meet the threat, and did not systematically
perform robust oversight to identify, address, and attempt to resolve the
16 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
many problems in national security and domestic agencies that became apparent
in the aftermath of 9/11.
So long as oversight is undermined by current congressional rules and resolutions,
we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need.The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee
structure to give America’s national intelligence agencies oversight, sup-port, and leadership.
Are We Safer?
Since 9/11, the United States and its allies have killed or captured a majority of al Qaeda’s leadership; toppled the Taliban, which gave al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan; and severely damaged the organization.Yet terrorist attacks continue.
Even as we have thwarted attacks, nearly everyone expects they will come. How can this be?
The problem is that al Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer directs. In this way it has transformed itself into a decentralized force. Bin Ladin may be limited
in his ability to organize major attacks from his hideouts.Yet killing or capturing
him, while extremely important, would not end terror. His message of inspiration to a new generation of terrorists would continue.
Because of offensive actions against al Qaeda since 9/11, and defensive actions to improve homeland security, we believe we are safer today. But we are not safe.We therefore make the following recommendations that we believe can make America safer and more secure.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Three years after 9/11, the national debate continues about how to protect our nation in this new era. We divide our recommendations into two basic parts: What to do, and how to do it.
WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY
The enemy is not just “terrorism.” It is the threat posed specifically by Islamist terrorism, by Bin Ladin and others who draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within a minority strain of Islam that does not distinguish politics from religion, and distorts both.
The enemy is not Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam.The
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 17
enemy goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part by al Qaeda, that has spawned other terrorist groups and violence.
Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends:dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that con-tributes to Islamist terrorism.
The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence,
covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.
What should Americans expect from their government? The goal seems unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be more devastating still.
Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy.Al Qaeda and other groups are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. It is an image of an omnipotent hydra of destruction.That image lowers expectations of government
effectiveness.
It lowers them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters.Yet the group was fragile and occasionally left vulnerable by the marginal,
unstable people often attracted to such causes.The enemy made mistakes. The U.S. government was not able to capitalize on them.
No president can promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9/11 will not happen again. But the American people are entitled to expect that officials will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.
We propose a strategy with three dimensions: (1) attack terrorists and their organizations, (2) prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and (3) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.
Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations
• Root out sanctuaries.The U.S. government should identify and prioritize
actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and have realistic country or regional strategies for each, utilizing every element of national power and reaching out to countries that can help us.
18 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
• Strengthen long-term U.S. and international commitments to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
• Confront problems with Saudi Arabia in the open and build a relation-ship beyond oil, a relationship that both sides can defend to their citizens
and includes a shared commitment to reform.
Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism
In October 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked if enough was being done “to fashion a broad integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists.”As part of such a plan,the U.S.government should
• Define the message and stand as an example of moral leadership in the world. To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death.America and its friends have the advantage—our vision can offer a better future.
• Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not offer opportunity, respect the rule of law, or tolerate differences, then the United States needs to stand for a better future.
• Communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world, through much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people, including students and leaders outside of government. Our efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War.
• Offer an agenda of opportunity that includes support for public education
and economic openness.
• Develop a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism, using a flexible contact group of leading coalition governments and fashioning a common coalition approach on issues like the treatment of captured terrorists.
• Devote a maximum effort to the parallel task of countering the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
• Expect less from trying to dry up terrorist money and more from following
the money for intelligence, as a tool to hunt terrorists, under-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 19
stand their networks, and disrupt their operations.
Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks
• Target terrorist travel, an intelligence and security strategy that the 9/11 story showed could be at least as powerful as the effort devoted to terrorist finance.
• Address problems of screening people with biometric identifiers across agencies and governments, including our border and transportation systems, by designing a comprehensive screening system that addresses common problems and sets common standards. As standards spread, this necessary and ambitious effort could dramatically strengthen the world’s ability to intercept individuals who could pose catastrophic threats.
• Quickly complete a biometric entry-exit screening system, one that also speeds qualified travelers.
• Set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification,
such as driver’s licenses.
• Develop strategies for neglected parts of our transportation security system. Since 9/11, about 90 percent of the nation’s $5 billion annual investment in transportation security has gone to aviation, to fight the last war.
• In aviation, prevent arguments about a new computerized profiling system from delaying vital improvements in the “no-fly” and “automatic
selectee” lists. Also, give priority to the improvement of check-point screening.
• Determine, with leadership from the President, guidelines for gathering
and sharing information in the new security systems that are needed,
guidelines that integrate safeguards for privacy and other essential liberties.
• Underscore that as government power necessarily expands in certain ways, the burden of retaining such powers remains on the executive to demonstrate the value of such poweres and ensure adequate supervi-
20 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
sion of how they are used,including a new board to oversee the implementation
of the guidelines needed for gathering and sharing information
in these new security systems.
• Base federal funding for emergency preparedness solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New York City and Washington, D.C., at the top of the current list. Such assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing or pork-barrel spending.
• Make homeland security funding contingent on the adoption of an incident command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, including
a regional approach. Allocate more radio spectrum and improve connectivity for public safety communications, and encourage wide-spread adoption of newly developed standards for private-sector emergency
preparedness—since the private sector controls 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure.
HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING GOVERNMENT
The strategy we have recommended is elaborate, even as presented here very briefly.To implement it will require a government better organized than the one that exists today, with its national security institutions designed half a century ago to win the Cold War. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system created a generation ago for a world that no longer exists.
Our detailed recommendations are designed to fit together.Their purpose is clear: to build unity of effort across the U.S. government. As one official now serving on the front lines overseas put it to us:“One fight, one team.”
We call for unity of effort in five areas, beginning with unity of effort on the challenge of counterterrorism itself:
• unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center;
• unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director;
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 21
• unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information sharing system that transcends
traditional governmental boundaries;
• unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability; and
• strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.
Unity of Effort: A National Counterterrorism Center
The 9/11 story teaches the value of integrating strategic intelligence from all sources into joint operational planning—with both dimensions spanning the foreign-domestic divide.
• In some ways, since 9/11, joint work has gotten better.The effort of fighting terrorism has flooded over many of the usual agency boundaries
because of its sheer quantity and energy.Attitudes have changed. But the problems of coordination have multiplied. The Defense Department alone has three unified commands (SOCOM, CENTCOM,
and NORTHCOM) that deal with terrorism as one of their principal concerns.
• Much of the public commentary about the 9/11 attacks has focused on “lost opportunities.”Though characterized as problems of “watch-listing,” “information sharing,” or “connecting the dots,” each of these labels is too narrow.They describe the symptoms,not the disease.
• Breaking the older mold of organization stovepiped purely in executive
agencies, we propose a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that would borrow the joint, unified command concept adopted in the 1980s by the American military in a civilian agency, combining the joint intelligence function alongside the operations work.
• The NCTC would build on the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center and would replace it and other terrorism “fusion centers” with-in the government.The NCTC would become the authoritative knowledge
bank, bringing information to bear on common plans. It should task collection requirements both inside and outside the United States.
22 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
• The NCTC should perform joint operational planning, assigning lead responsibilities to existing agencies and letting them direct the actual execution of the plans.
• Placed in the Executive Office of the President, headed by a Senate-confirmed official (with rank equal to the deputy head of a cabinet department) who reports to the National Intelligence Director, the NCTC would track implementation of plans. It would be able to influence the leadership and the budgets of the counterterrorism operating arms of the CIA, the FBI, and the departments of Defense and Homeland Security.
• The NCTC should not be a policymaking body. Its operations and planning should follow the policy direction of the president and the National Security Council.
Unity of Effort: A National Intelligence Director
Since long before 9/11—and continuing to this day—the intelligence community
is not organized well for joint intelligence work. It does not employ common
standards and practices in reporting intelligence or in training experts overseas and at home.The expensive national capabilities for collecting intelligence
have divided management.The structures are too complex and too secret.
• The community’s head—the Director of Central Intelligence—has at least three jobs: running the CIA, coordinating a 15-agency confederation,
and being the intelligence analyst-in-chief to the president. No one person can do all these things.
• A new National Intelligence Director should be established with two main jobs: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers that combine experts from all the collection disciplines against common targets— like counterterrorism or nuclear proliferation; and (2) to oversee the agencies that contribute to the national intelligence program, a task that includes setting common standards for personnel and information technology.
• The national intelligence centers would be the unified commands of the intelligence world—a long-overdue reform for intelligence comparable
to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols law that reformed the organization
of national defense.The home services—such as the CIA, DIA,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 23
Executive Office of the President POTUS National Intelligence Director Staff National Counterterrorism Center Hire,Train, Acquire, Equip & Field (agencies support / staff the Nat’l Intel Centers) Deputy NID Foreign Intelligence (CIA Dir.) Deputy NID Defense Intelligence (USD Intelligence) Deputy NID Homeland Intelligence (FBI/Intel Dir.) National Intelligence Centers (conduct “joint” collection and analysis -illustrative) WMD Proliferation Int’l Crime & Narcotics China / East Asia Middle East Russia / Eurasia CIA Clandestine Services All-Source Analysis Open Source Agency (new) DIA NSA NGA NRO Other FBI Intel & CT / CI DHS / IAIP Other DHS (e.g., CBP,TSA, Nat’l Labs, Coast Guard, etc.)
Unity of Effort in Managing Intelligence
24 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
NSA, and FBI—would organize, train, and equip the best intelligence professionals in the world, and would handle the execution of intelligence
operations in the field.
• This National Intelligence Director (NID) should be located in the Executive Office of the President and report directly to the president, yet be confirmed by the Senate. In addition to overseeing the National Counterterrorism Center described above (which will include both the national intelligence center for terrorism and the joint operations planning effort), the NID should have three deputies:
• For foreign intelligence (a deputy who also would be the head of the CIA)
• For defense intelligence (also the under secretary of defense for intelligence)
• For homeland intelligence (also the executive assistant director for intelligence at the FBI or the under secretary of homeland security
for information analysis and infrastructure protection)
• The NID should receive a public appropriation for national intelligence,
should have authority to hire and fire his or her intelligence deputies, and should be able to set common personnel and information
technology policies across the intelligence community.
• The CIA should concentrate on strengthening the collection capabilities
of its clandestine service and the talents of its analysts, building pride in its core expertise.
• Secrecy stifles oversight, accountability, and information sharing. Unfortunately, all the current organizational incentives encourage overclassification. This balance should change; and as a start, open information should be provided about the overall size of agency intelligence
budgets.
Unity of Effort: Sharing Information
The U.S. government has access to a vast amount of information. But it has a weak system for processing and using what it has. The system of “need to know” should be replaced by a system of “need to share.”
• The President should lead a government-wide effort to bring the
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 25
major national security institutions into the information revolution, turning a mainframe system into a decentralized network.The obstacles
are not technological. Official after official has urged us to call attention to problems with the unglamorous “back office” side of government
operations.
• But no agency can solve the problems on its own—to build the net-work requires an effort that transcends old divides, solving common legal and policy issues in ways that can help officials know what they can and cannot do. Again, in tackling information issues, America needs unity of effort.
Unity of Effort: Congress
Congress took too little action to adjust itself or to restructure the executive branch to address the emerging terrorist threat. Congressional oversight for intelligence—and counterterrorism—is dysfunctional. Both Congress and the executive need to do more to minimize national security risks during transitions
between administrations.
• For intelligence oversight, we propose two options: either a joint committee
on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or a single committee in each house combining authorizing and appropriating committees. Our central message is the same: the intelligence
committees cannot carry out their oversight function unless they are made stronger, and thereby have both clear responsibility and accountability for that oversight.
• Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security.There should be one permanent standing
committee for homeland security in each chamber.
• We propose reforms to speed up the nomination, financial reporting, security clearance, and confirmation process for national security officials
at the start of an administration, and suggest steps to make sure that incoming administrations have the information they need.
Unity of Effort: Organizing America’s Defenses in the United States
We have considered several proposals relating to the future of the domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission.Adding a new domestic intelligence
26 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
agency will not solve America’s problems in collecting and analyzing intelligence
within the United States.We do not recommend creating one.
• We propose the establishment of a specialized and integrated national security workforce at the FBI, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security.
At several points we asked: Who has the responsibility for defending us at home? Responsibility for America’s national defense is shared by the Department of Defense, with its new Northern Command, and by the Department of Homeland Security.They must have a clear delineation of roles, missions, and authority.
• The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly
assess the adequacy of Northern Command’s strategies and planning to defend against military threats to the homeland.
• The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces, in order to determine the adequacy of the government’s plans and the readiness
of the government to respond to those threats.
* * *
We call on the American people to remember how we all felt on 9/11, to remember not only the unspeakable horror but how we came together as a nation—one nation. Unity of purpose and unity of effort are the way we will defeat this enemy and make America safer for our children and grandchildren.
We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have recommended,
and we will participate vigorously in that debate.

Ацки многа букф.
Можно в кратце о чем буржуи пишут?

Report to
the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States:
The FBI’s
Counterterrorism Program
Since September 2001
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
April 14, 2004
Report to
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States
The FBI’s
Counterterrorism
Program
Since September 2001
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................11
II FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART................................................. 33
III TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT REFORMS AND
INITIATIVES SINCE 9/11/01.......................................................... 44
IV INTRODUCTION......................................................................................66
V PRIORITIZATION....................................................................................77
The New Priorities.........................................................................................77
1 Protect the United States from Terrorist Attack..........................................77
2 Protect the United States Against Foreign Intelligence Operations and
Espionage........................................................................................77
3 Protect the United States Against Cyber-based Attacks and
High-Technology Crimes..................................................................88
4 Combat Public Corruption at all Levels.......................................................88
5 Protect Civil Rights......................................................................................88
6 Combat Transnational/National Criminal Organizations and Enterprises...88
7 Combat Major White-Collar Crime..............................................................88
8 Combat Significant Violent Crime...............................................................88
9 Support Federal, State, Municipal, and International Partners...................99
10 Upgrade Technology to Successfully Perform the FBI's Mission...............99
Implementing the New Priorities.............................................................99
1 Communication of Priorities........................................................................99
2 Priorities in the Budgetary Process...........................................................1100
3 Enforcement of Priorities...........................................................................1111
VI MOBILIZATION.......................................................................................1122
Personnel Mobilized....................................................................................1.2
Expanded Operational Capabilities.......................................................13
Counterterrorism Watch............................................................................1133
National Joint Terrorism Task Force..........................................................1.4
Terrorism Financing Operations Section...................................................1..5..
Evidence Exploitation.................................................................................1.
6
Fly-Away/Rapid Deployment Teams..........................................................1..6
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force.......................................................1..6
Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Group........................................................1..7
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Unit.................................................1..7
Language Translation.................................................................................17
Special Technologies and Applications Section........................................1..8
Investigative Technology Division..............................................................1..9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
VII CENTRALIZATION............................................................................2200
Investigative Operations Branch....................................................................2..1.21
Operational Support Branch............................................................................2..2.22
Counterterrorism Analysis Branch.............................................................2..2.. ...22
VIII INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION..............................................2233
Integrating Criminal and Intelligence Operations...................................2..3..23
Integrating Intelligence Processes in our Operations............................2..4.24
1 Initial Deployment of Analysts....................................................................2255
2 Office of Intelligence..................................................................................2255
3 Intelligence Program..................................................................................2255
EAD Intelligence...............................................................................2266
Concepts of Operations....................................................................2266
Field Office Intelligence Operations...................................................2..8
Requirements Process.....................................................................2288
Baselining of Sources.......................................................................2299
Analytical Assets................................................................................29
Intelligence Production Board...........................................................3300
4 Intelligence Workforce................................................................................3311
Recruitment.......................................................................................3311
Special Agents Career Track............................................................3311
Training.............................................................................................3322
Program Evaluations........................................................................3344
Special Agent Evaluations................................................................3355
Evaluation of Special Agents in Charge...........................................3366
IX COORDINATION.................................................................................3377
State and Municipal Law Enforcement..................................................3..7.3
7
Task Forces...............................................................................................3388
Office of Law Enforcement Coordination...................................................3399
Terrorist Screening Center........................................................................3399
Law Enforcement Online...........................................................................4400
Alert Notification System............................................................................4411
Intelligence Bulletins..................................................................................4411
Information Sharing Pilot Projects..............................................................4411
Security Clearances...................................................................................4411
New Counterterrorism Training Initiatives..................................................4422
Behavior Analysis Unit...............................................................................4433
Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory Program....................................4433
Intelligence Community...............................................................................………43..
1 Terrorist Threat Integration Center.......................................................……… 43
2 Exchange of Personnel...................................................................................... 44
3 Joint Briefings................................................................................................….. 44
4 Secure Networks............................................................................................…. 44
5 Compatability of Information Technology Systems...........................4..4.44
6 Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center....................................45
Department of Homeland Security.............................................................4..5....45
Foreign Governments.....................................................................................4..6..............46
1 International Investigations...............................................................4..6.......46
2 Expansion of Legal Attaché Offices..................................................4..6.......46
3 Joint Task Forces and Operations....................................................4..7.......47
4 Fingerprint/Identification Initiatives....................................................4..7......47
5 International Training Initiatives........................................................4..8.......48
Private Sector ..................................................................................................4..9..............49
1 Community Outreach........................................................................4..9.......49
2 Infragard............................................................................................4..9......49
3 Financial Sector Outreach.................................................................5..0......50
4 Railroad Initiative...............................................................................5..0..
....50
X INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY............................................ 51
Centralized Management..........................................................................5151
Trilogy...........................................................................................................5252
Data Warehousing......................................................................................5353
Analytical Tools..........................................................................................5454
Putting It All Together...............................................................................5656
XI ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM..................................................5757
Strategic Planning......................................................................................5577
Realigning the Workforce.........................................................................5577
1 Revised Personnel Selection Process .............................................5..8.......58
2 Streamlined Hiring Process...............................................................5..9......59
Training.......................................................................................................... 59
Executive Leadership Initiatives...............................................................5.599
Records Management...............................................................................6060
1 Centralizing Records Management...................................................6..0..
....60
2 Turning Paper into Searchable Data.................................................6..0......60
3 New Records Control Schedule........................................................6..1......61
4 Improving Efficiency..........................................................................6..1.. ....61
1
2
3
4
5
6
XII
ASSESSMENT OF OUR PROGRESS...........................................
Development of Human Assets.......................................................
Number of FISAs ..............................................................................
Number of Intelligence Reports Generated....................................
Quality of Daily Counterterrorism Briefings...................................
Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Operations..............................
Respect for Civil Liberties..........................................................................70
1 Statutory Limitations...................................................................................71
2 Oversight Mechanisms...............................................................................71
3 Self Regulation and Enforcement......................................................
............................................................................................74
DIRECTOR’S NOTE.....................................................................................
Security Management...............................................................................
Information Assurance Plan........................................................................
Enterprise Operations Center.................................................….................
Audits and Reviews................................................................................…
Security Officers.......................................................................................…
Security Education.....................................................................................
Disaster Recovery Planning.......................................................................…
61
61
61
62
62
62
62
63
64
64
67
70
71
71
72
65
63
74
74
XIII CONCLUSION
Executive Summary
Since the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, the men and women of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) have implemented a comprehensive plan that fundamentally transforms the
organization to enhance our ability to predict and prevent terrorism. We overhauled our
counterterrorism operations, expanded our intelligence capabilities, modernized our business
practices and technology, and improved coordination with our partners.
Our plan consists of seven basic elements:
1 Prioritization
We replaced a priority system that allowed supervisors a great deal of flexibility with a set of 10
priorities that strictly govern the allocation of personnel and resources in every FBI program and
field office. Counterterrorism is now our overriding priority, and every terrorism lead is addressed,
even if it requires a diversion of resources from other priority areas.
2 Mobilization
To implement these new priorities, we increased the number of Special Agents assigned to
terrorism matters and hired hundreds of intelligence analysts and translators. We also established
a number of operational units that give us new or improved capabilities to address the terrorist
threat. These include the 24/7 Counterterrorism Watch and the National Joint Terrorism Task
Force to manage and share threat information; the Terrorism Financing Operation Section to
centralize efforts to stop terrorist financing; document/media exploitation squads to exploit
material found overseas for its intelligence value; deployable “Fly Teams” to lend counterterrorism
expertise wherever it is needed; and the Terrorist Screening Center and Foreign Terrorist Tracking
Task Force to help identify terrorists and keep them out of the United States (U.S.).
3 Centralization
We centralized management of our Counterterrorism Program at Headquarters to limit “stovepiping”
of information, to ensure consistency of counterterrorism priorities and strategy across
the organization, to integrate counterterrorism operations here and overseas, to improve
coordination with other agencies and governments, and to make senior managers accountable
for the overall development and success of our counterterrorism efforts.
4 Intelligence Integration
We are building an enterprise-wide intelligence program that has substantially improved our
ability to strategically direct our intelligence collection and to fuse, analyze, and disseminate our
terrorism-related intelligence. After the USA PATRIOT Act, related Attorney General Guidelines,
and the ensuing opinion by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review removed the
barrier to sharing information between intelligence and criminal investigations, we quickly
implemented a plan to integrate all our capabilities to better prevent terrorist attacks. We then
1
elevated intelligence to program-level status, putting in place a formal structure and concepts
of operations to govern FBI-wide intelligence functions, and establishing Field Intelligence Groups
in every field office. We recently issued a series of new procedures that fundamentally transform
our approach to hiring, training, and career development to cultivate and instill a capacity and
understanding of intelligence processes and objectives within the entire Bureau workforce.
5 Coordination
Understanding that we cannot defeat terrorism without strong partnerships, we have enhanced
the level of coordination and information sharing with state and municipal law enforcement
personnel. We expanded the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, increased technological
connectivity with our partners, and implemented new ways of sharing information through vehicles
such as the Intelligence Bulletin, the Alert System, and the Terrorist Screening Center. To
improve coordination with other federal agencies and members of the Intelligence Community,
we joined with our federal partners to establish the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, exchanged
personnel, instituted joint briefings, and started using secure networks to share information. We
also improved our relationships with foreign governments by building on the overseas expansion
started under Director Louis Freeh; by offering investigative and forensic support and training;
and by working together on task forces and joint operations. Finally, we expanded outreach to
minority communities, and improved coordination with private businesses involved in critical
infrastructure and finance.
6 Information Technology
We are making substantial progress in upgrading our information technology to streamline our
business processes and to improve our ability to search for and analyze information, draw
connections, and share it both inside the Bureau and out. We deployed a secure high-speed
network, put new or upgraded computers on desktops, and consolidated terrorist information
in a searchable central database. We developed, and are preparing to launch, the Virtual Case
File, a state-of-the-art case management system that will revolutionize how the FBI does business.
7 Administrative Reform
Re-engineering efforts are making our bureaucracy more efficient and more responsive to
operational needs. We revised our approach to strategic planning, and we refocused our
recruiting and hiring to attract individuals with skills critical to our counterterrorism and intelligence
missions. We developed a more comprehensive training program and instituted new leadership
initiatives to keep our workforce flexible. We are modernizing the storage and management of
FBI records. We also built, and continue to improve, an extensive security program with
centralized leadership, professional security personnel, more rigorous security measures, and
improved security education and training.
These improvements have produced tangible and measurable results. We significantly increased
the number of human sources and the amount of surveillance coverage to support our counterterrorism
efforts. We developed and refined a process for briefing daily threat information, and we considerably
increased the number of FBI intelligence reports produced and disseminated. Perhaps most
important, since September 11, 2001, we have participated in disrupting dozens of terrorist
operations by developing actionable intelligence and better coordinating our counterterrorism
efforts.
It is a testament to the character and dedication of the men and women of the FBI that they have
implemented these reforms and realized this progress, while continuing to carry out their responsibility
to investigate and protect America from criminal, counterintelligence, and terrorist threats of virtually
unprecedented dimensions.
2
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR
DEPUTY
DIRECTOR
SAC ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
CHIEF OF STAFF
INSPECTION DIVISION
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
OFFICE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Executive Assistant
Director for
INTELLIGENCE
Executive Assistant
Director for
CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS
Executive Assistant
Director for
LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES
Executive Assistant
Director for
ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE
OF
INTELLIGENCE
COUNTERTERRORISM
DIVISION
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
DIVISION
CYBER
DIVISION
CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIVE
DIVISION
TRAINING
DIVISION
LABORATORY
DIVISION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
INFORMATION
SERVICES DIVISION
INVESTIGATIVE
TECHNOLOGY
DIVISION
FINANCE
DIVISION
OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC
PLANNING
RECORDS
MANAGEMENT
DIVISION
OFFICE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT
COORDINATION
OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS
CRITICAL INCIDENT
RESPONSE GROUP
SECURITY
DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES
DIVISION
INFORMATION
RESOURCES
DIVISION
Executive Assistant
Director for
COUNTERTERRORISM/
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
3
4
5
INTRODUCTION
During the past 31 months, the FBI has undergone a transformation in all areas of its operations.
The transformation has involved both the institution of new functions and capacities as well as
refinements of existing processes and programs to modernize our operations.
an overview of that reform process.
We have always had responsibility for the counterterrorism mission, and the Bureau has a history
of impressive accomplishments in the war against terrorism.
Theodore Kaczynski, to the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the 1998 East Africa Embassy
bombings, the FBI has investigated terrorist acts and helped to bring many of those responsible to
justice.
commission, as evidenced by the foiling of the Millennium Plot to plant explosives at Los Angeles
International Airport, the apprehension and prosecution of Ramzi Yousef and others for conspiracy
to bomb United States commercial airliners, and the arrest and prosecution of Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman and his co-conspirators before they could carry out their plan to bomb office buildings,
bridges, and tunnels in New York City.
Throughout his tenure, Director Louis Freeh and his executives took steps to build that preventive
capacity within the Bureau.
Division and staffed it with analysts who were tasked with identifying and predicting criminal and
terrorist threats.
in other countries by nearly doubling the number of Legal Attaché offices overseas.
devised and implemented a strategy for developing a counterterrorism capability in each FBI field
office.
The FBI responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001, with a clear recognition that we needed
both to build on the progress of the past decade and to enhance our operations and focus to meet
the deadly challenge of modern terrorism.
have been reforming our organization, operations, and long-term objectives to make the prevention
of terrorist attacks the Bureau’s overriding priority.
This new operational focus required that we fundamentally transform our organization to
enhance our ability to predict and prevent terrorism.
transformation that has seven basic elements:
• Prioritization
• Mobilization
• Centralization
• Intelligence Integration
• Coordination
• Information Technology
• Administrative Reform
These elements are the foundation of an effective Counterterrorism Program.
each element of the plan in some detail.
6
This report provides
From the apprehension of Unabomber
In addition, the Bureau has participated in preventing many terrorist acts before their
They established an Intelligence Section within the Investigative Services
They greatly enhanced our ability to coordinate investigations with our counterparts
Also, they
In a process that started on September 11, 2001, we
We have followed a plan for this
The following describes
PRIORITIZATION
In 1998, the FBI established a five-year strategic plan to set investigative priorities in line
with a three-tiered structure. Tier 1 included those crimes or intelligence matters – including
terrorism – that threaten our national or economic security. Tier 2 included offenses involving
criminal enterprises, public corruption, and violations of civil rights. Tier 3 included violations that
affect individuals or property. This priority structure allowed supervisors substantial flexibility in
applying the priorities to their decision making. Consequently, though a top-tier priority, the
Counterterrorism Program did not receive a sufficiently significant increase in focus or resources.
On September 11, 2001, the prevention of further terrorism became the Bureau's dominant priority.
On May 29, 2002, we formalized this prioritization by issuing a new hierarchy of programmatic
priorities, with counterterrorism at the top. We developed these priorities by evaluating each
criminal and national security threat within the Bureau’s jurisdiction according to three factors:
1) the significance of the threat to the security of the United States, as expressed by the President
in National Security Presidential Directive 26; 2) the priority the American public places on the
threat; and 3) the degree to which addressing the threat falls most exclusively within the FBI's
jurisdiction.
The New Priorities
The FBI has ten top priorities. Priorities one through eight are program areas, and they
are listed in the order in which they must be addressed. Priorities nine and ten are objectives that
are key to the accomplishment of the programmatic priorities. The priorities are:
1 Protect the United States from Terrorist Attack
Every FBI manager, Special Agent, and support employee understands that the prevention
of terrorist attacks is the FBI's overriding priority and that every terrorism-related lead must be
addressed. Counterterrorism is the top priority in the allocation of funding, personnel, physical
space, and resources, as well as in hiring and training. No matter their program assignment,
all FBI field, operational, and support personnel stand ready to assist in our counterterrorism
efforts.
2 Protect the United States Against Foreign Intelligence Operations
and Espionage
The FBI is the lead federal agency with a mandate to investigate foreign counterintelligence
threats within our borders. During the past 31 months, we have created a nationally-directed
program for counterintelligence, staffed by a highly trained specialized workforce with enhanced
analytical support, and with closer ties to the Intelligence Community. The program’s focus
is on: 1) preventing hostile groups and countries from acquiring technology to produce weapons
of mass destruction; 2) preventing the compromise of personnel, information, technology, and
economic interests vital to our national security; and 3) producing intelligence on the plans and
intentions of our adversaries.
7
3 Protect the United States Against Cyber-Based Attacks
and High-Technology Crimes
We continue to see a dramatic rise in both cyber crimes, such as denial of service attacks, and
traditional crimes that have migrated on-line, such as identity theft and child pornography. The
FBI is the only government entity with the wide-ranging jurisdiction, technical resources,
personnel, and network of relationships necessary to address the threat from multi-jurisdictional
cyber crimes and cyber terrorism. Accordingly, the FBI created a national cyber program with
a Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters and cyber squads in the field offices. The program
focuses on identifying and pursuing: 1) individuals or groups who conduct computer intrusions
and spread malicious code; 2) intellectual property thieves; 3) Internet fraudsters; and
4) on-line predators who sexually exploit or endanger children.
4 Combat Public Corruption at All Levels
The FBI has extensive experience investigating public corruption. Our public corruption
investigations focus on all levels of government (local, state, and federal) and address all types
of judicial, legislative, regulatory, and law enforcement corruption.
5 Protect Civil Rights
The FBI is the federal agency with responsibility for investigating allegations of federal civil
rights violations and abuses. In pursuit of this mission, the FBI investigates allegations of
brutality and related misconduct by law enforcement officers as well as hate crimes. Recently,
our civil rights program has focused particularly on hate crime cases related to Muslim, Sikh,
and Arab-American communities that suffered threats and attacks in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
6 Combat Transnational and National Criminal Organizations and Enterprises
As the world grows smaller and investigations become more international, the FBI increasingly
uses its expertise and relationships with foreign counterparts to dismantle or disrupt those
major criminal enterprises that are responsible for cross-border criminal activity.
7 Combat Major White-Collar Crime
The FBI has expertise in the investigation of white-collar criminal activities that are international,
national, or regional in scope. During the past two years, we have dedicated scores of agents
to the investigation of corporate scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, and others, and focused
our criminal analytical capabilities on major health care fraud and bank fraud threats. At the
same time, we are scaling back our investigations into smaller bank frauds and embezzlements
that are ably handled by other agencies and our state and municipal partners.
8 Combat Significant Violent Crime
Most violent crime in the U.S. is investigated and prosecuted by state or municipal authorities.
While federal statutes give the FBI jurisdiction over many types of violent crime, we choose
our investigations carefully so as not to duplicate the tremendous job being done by our state
and municipal partners. We concentrate our efforts on those criminal targets – such as
organized criminal enterprises and violent narcotics gangs – that pose a significant threat to
our society. We participate in the fight against violent crime wherever we bring something
special to the mix, whether it is special capabilities, resources, or our jurisdiction to enforce
applicable federal statutes.
8
9 Support Federal, State, Municipal, and International Partners
Our preventive mission requires a high level of engagement with state and municipal law
enforcement, other federal agencies, members of the Intelligence Community, and our
international counterparts. Accordingly, we have made it a top priority to improve information
sharing and coordination, and to provide training and other support to our partners.
10 Upgrade Technology to Successfully Perform the FBI's Mission
We are upgrading our technology by deploying a state-of-the-art secure network, putting
new computers with new software on desktops, and building centralized databases. We are
expanding our capabilities to fully exploit digital information and to share the results internally
and externally. We also are educating our workforce to ensure that everyone understands
how technology can help us do our job better.
Implementing the New Priorities
To ensure adherence to the new priorities, we reduced the flexibility that was built into
the old three-tiered system. Instead of allowing field offices to choose how to allocate
resources within broad priority areas, the new system dictates that managers satisfy
operational needs in the strict order of their priority. Special Agents in Charge (SACs) making
deployment decisions must first dedicate sufficient resources to handle priority one before handling
priority two, and so forth. Similarly, Headquarters managers must provide services – such as
training, hiring, and technology improvements – to operational programs in order of priority.
Communication of Priorities
Understanding that successful implementation of the new priorities requires universal
commitment to them, we embarked on a multi-faceted education campaign. We significantly
increased the number of SAC conferences where we discuss the new priorities and task
the SACs to communicate the message to their personnel in the field. Senior Headquarters
executives regularly discuss the priorities in speeches, congressional testimony, published
articles, employee e-mails and meetings. The FBI's intranet and employee publications,
such as The Investigator magazine, provide continued updates and guidance on the new
priorities to our employees. Also, a number of senior executives have begun traveling
to each field office to deliver a multimedia presentation that educates employees about
the current status of our new priorities and associated organizational reforms.
9
Priorities in the Budgetary Process
Our commitment to these priorities is reflected in our budget and resource management.
Counterterrorism and intelligence-related funding and personnel needs have been the top
priorities in our budget requests to the Attorney General, the President, and the Congress
since the events of September 11, 2001. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2001, approximately 32
percent of the FBI’s annual appropriation was dedicated to national security programs
(counterterrorism and counterintelligence). For FY 2004, that number is 40 percent of the
overall budget.
Construction
$16,650,000
Forensic
$138,279,000
Security
$38,364,000
National
Security
$1,050,354,000
Criminal
$1,588,544,000
Cyber
Investigations
$31,835,000
Criminal 49%
National
Security 32%
1%
4%
1%
Technology
12% 1%
FY 2001 Appropriations
Technology
Investments
$381,106,000
Construction
$11,056,000
Forensic
$198,047,000
Security
$203,725,000
National
Security
$1,851,663,000
Criminal
$1,583,535,000
Cyber
Investigations
$234,471,000
Technology
Investments
$523,752,000
<1%
Criminal 34%
Technology
11%
5%
Cyber
National
Security40%
5%4%
FY 2004 Appropriations
For FY 2005, the President has submitted a budget proposal that calls for further increases
in the resources available for counterterrorism activities and expands the percentage
of the FBI’s budget dedicated to national security matters to 44 percent. Compared to
FY 2001, this more than doubles the amount of funding for counterterrorism and
counterintelligence and equates to an 80 percent increase in the number of people devoted
to the counterterrorism and counterintelligence missions.
10
$1,638,867,000
$2,241,114.000
Construction
$1,242,000
Forensic
$166,615,000
Security
$262,083,000
Technology
Investments
National
Security
Criminal
$522,308,000
Cyber
Investigations
$283,041,000
<1%
Criminal 32%
Technology
10%
5%
Cyber
National
Security 44%
5%
3%
FY 2005 President’s Request
Enforcement of Priorities
Senior managers at Headquarters and in the field have been instructed that they must
address and resolve every counterterrorism lead, even if it requires a diversion of personnel
or resources from other priority areas.
that a field office’s operations appeared inconsistent with this directive.
sent to these field offices to conduct a thorough audit and to determine whether the office
was complying with the new priorities.
inspectors made recommendations for correcting the problem, and these recommendations
were promptly implemented.
We are revising our performance metrics and inspection criteria to better evaluate
performance and resource allocation in accordance with the new priorities.
are discussed in more detail under Intelligence Integration (page 34).
11
On two occasions, Headquarters received indications
Inspectors were
In the one instance where a problem was found,
These measures
Mobilization
In accordance with the new priorities, we mobilized and substantially reallocated resources and
personnel to the counterterrorism mission. We increased the number of counterterrorism agents,
intelligence analysts, and translators, and established a number of new operational components
dedicated to the counterterrorism mission. Each of these components represents a new capacity,
or an enhanced capacity, for the Bureau in the war against terrorism. In addition, FBI personnel
who do not work on counterterrorism matters full-time stand by to support our number one priority
as needed.
As of February 29, 2004, the FBI has just over 28,000 employees, of which 11,881 are Special
Agents. These men and women provide a surge capacity that enables the FBI to respond to
terrorism threats and to ensure that every terrorism lead is followed to its resolution. In the autumn
of 2001, approximately 67 percent, or more than 4,000 of our agents in the field who previously
worked on criminal investigative matters were diverted to investigate the September 11, 2001,
attacks or the subsequent anthrax attacks. Analysts from the Counterintelligence and Criminal
Investigative Divisions also were deployed to assist in these counterterrorism efforts.
Today, all Special Agents are adept in the use of the investigative tools used in counterterrorism
investigations and can be mobilized to assist counterterrorism efforts when needed. The fact that
counterterrorism is the top priority for the Criminal Investigative Division ensures that all of its
personnel will be made available when this surge capacity is required. Standardized processes
for conducting analysis and producing intelligence products allow for all FBI analysts to lend
assistance to the Counterterrorism Program. The flexibility to leverage and mobilize all our
personnel in this manner is critical to our ability to respond quickly to evolving threats.
Personnel Mobilized
Special Agents
Since September 11, 2001, we have
increased the number of Special Agents
working terrorism matters from 1,351 to
2,398.
September 11, 2001
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0 Present
Counterterrorism Agents
3000
2398
1351
12
13
Intelligence Analysts
We have increased the number of analysts
supporting our counterterrorism mission.
Immediately after September 11, 2001, we
transferred analysts from other divisions to
counterterrorism and integrated analysts detailed
from other agencies – including 25 analysts and
an analyst supervisor detailed from the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). Since then, we have
made progress toward building a strong
analytical cadre through targeted recruitment
and enhanced training and career development.
FBI ANALYSTS
YEAR
FY 2001
FY 2002
FY 2003
3/4/2004
Grand
Total
TOTAL
1023
1012
1180
1197
42
96
250
72
460
HIRED
Translators
Our Counterterrorism Program relies heavily on linguistic capabilities for translation services,
interview support, and surveillance activities, and these needs are growing. Since September
11, 2001, electronic surveillance collection in Arabic, Urdu, Pashto, and various other Middle
Eastern languages has increased by 75 percent or more. To meet this growing need, since
the beginning of FY 2001, we have recruited and processed more than 30,000 translator
applicants. These efforts have resulted in the addition of nearly 700 new translators, including
both FBI employees and contract linguists.
More than 95 percent of our translators are native speakers of the foreign language. Their
native proficiencies equip them with both a firm grasp of colloquial and idiomatic speech, and
an understanding of the religious, cultural, and historical references needed to effectively
perform the wide range of services required of an FBI linguist. To further ensure the quality
of translations, on December 1, 2003, we instituted a national quality control program. All
material produced by translators on board for
less than three months is subject to accuracy
and content reviews by senior staff, and their
products are subject to periodic audits thereafter.
Our translator corps is complemented by well
over 1,000 Special Agents and intelligence
analysts with foreign language proficiencies at
the minimum working level or higher.
Expanded Operational
Capabilities
Counterterrorism Watch
On September 11, 2001, we formed the Executive
Watch, later renamed the Counterterrorism Watch
Unit (CT Watch). CT Watch receives threat
information from a variety of sources, including
FBI Headquarters divisions, field offices, Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), the intelligence and homeland security communities, and state
and municipal law enforcement. CT Watch assesses information for credibility and urgency,
and tasks appropriate FBI divisions to take action on or further investigate that information.
Arabic
Farsi
Pashto
Urdu
Chinese
French
Hebrew
Korean
Kurdish
Russian
Turkish
70
24
1
6
67
16
4
18
0
78
2
MAJOR
LANGUAGE 9/11/01 Present Net Change
207
55
10
21
119
34
11
25
5
100
10
+137
+31
+9
+15
+52
+18
+7
+7
+5
+22
+8
INCREASED LANGUAGE
TRANSLATION CAPABILITIES
to Support Counterterrorism
13
National Joint Terrorism Task Force
Immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, an ad hoc group of representatives
from federal agencies began meeting, sharing information, and working together in the
FBI’s Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) at Headquarters. On July 18, 2002,
we formally created the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) to act as a liaison
and conduit for information on threats and leads from FBI Headquarters to the local JTTFs
and to 38 participating agencies. The NJTTF now includes representatives from members
of the Intelligence Community; components of the Departments of Homeland Security,
Defense, Justice, Treasury, Transportation, Commerce, Energy, State, and the Interior;
the City of New York Police Department; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Railroad
Police; U.S. Capitol Police; and others.
All members are provided with access to the FBI intranet, including its internal e-mail
system, and to the FBI’s investigative database for purposes of counterterrorism investigations.
In turn, members provide access to their organizations’ respective databases. In addition,
Daily Secure Video Conferences, coordinated by the National Security Council, are held
within SIOC and attended by NJTTF members, ensuring that all member agencies of the
NJTTF receive the latest threat briefings.
The NJTTF also works with the FBI’s Office of Intelligence to coordinate inter-agency
intelligence-gathering initiatives, such as the following:
Foreign Flight Crew Vetting
In September 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requested assistance
in vetting certain foreign flight crew members who have access to commercial aircraft
cockpits while in U.S. airspace. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
provided 6,200 names and dates of birth to the National Joint Terrorism Task Force.
The NJTTF ran the names against a number of FBI and Intelligence Community
databases and identified 184 possible matches. The NJTTF then assembled members
from several federal agencies to review the findings and to determine if any possible
matches posed a threat to aviation using the TSA’s baseline for a "No Fly List"
candidate. After a thorough review, 25 names were placed on the "No Fly" list.
Maritime Initiatives
The NJTTF is spearheading the Maritime Threat Project – a multi-agency, cooperative
effort to prevent or disrupt potential maritime attacks. The Maritime Threat Project
consolidates information on suspicious activities – such as persons conducting
surveillance around ports – and forwards appropriate leads to local JTTFs and other
agencies for additional investigation. As a part of this Maritime Threat Project, for
example, the NJTTF sent leads to all JTTFs with instructions for them to canvass
diving schools in their areas to identify suspicious activity and potential leads.
A related effort is “Operation Drydock,” in which the Coast Guard Investigative Service
and the NJTTF collaborated to identify and appropriately respond to national security
concerns related to merchant marine documents and licenses. This initiative addresses
the use of fraudulent credentials by individuals seeking to work aboard commercial
ships, and recently identified 11 individuals with ties to terrorist organizations.
14
Operation TRIPWIRE
Operation TRIPWIRE is designed to improve the FBI's intelligence base with a specific
goal to aid in identifying potential terrorist sleeper cells within the U.S. It puts in place a
roadmap for developing intelligence and collection requirements targeting terrorist training,
financing, recruiting, logistical support, and pre-attack preparation within the U.S.
Examples of TRIPWIRE operations are as follows:
Agricultural Aviation Threat Project
The FBI, through the NJTTF, identified and interviewed agricultural aviation owners
and operators throughout the country. The FBI reviewed a list of over 11,000
aircraft provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and interviewed
3,028 crop duster owners and operators. To date, this effort has led to the initiation
of several counterterrorism investigations.
Correctional Intelligence Initiative
Another initiative being coordinated through the NJTTF aims to detect and interdict
efforts by al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups to recruit within the U.S. prison inmate
population. All JTTFs have been tasked to coordinate with the correctional agencies
within their respective geographic regions to exchange intelligence and recruit
human sources. JTTF members are identifying existing or former sources who
are now incarcerated and reactivating them to infiltrate any radical elements. To
date, these efforts have identified approximately 370 connections between particular
inmates and domestic and international terrorism investigations, and have identified
a number of instances of potential terrorism-related activity within the prisons.
Terrorism Financing Operations Section
On September 13, 2001, we created the Financial Review Group, later renamed the Terrorism
Financing Operations Section (TFOS), to consolidate our approach to dismantling terrorist
financing operations. TFOS works not only to identify and track financial transactions and links
after a terrorist act has occurred; it exploits financial information to identify previously unknown
terrorist cells, to recognize potential terrorist activity or planning, and to predict and prevent
potential terrorist acts.
TFOS is both an operational and coordinating entity. Operationally, TFOS has been involved
in the financial investigations of more than 3,000 individuals and groups suspected of financially
supporting terrorist organizations, and joint efforts with its partners have resulted in the blocking
or freezing of millions of dollars in assets. TFOS works closely with our experts in criminal
money laundering, and leverages the resources of our Financial Crimes Section in the Criminal
Investigative Division as needed.
As a coordinating entity, TFOS ensures that a unified approach is pursued in investigating
terrorist financing networks. TFOS coordinates financial aspects of FBI terrorism investigations,
establishes overall initiatives and policies on terrorist financing matters, and coordinates with
the National Security Council's Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorist Financing, the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the financial services sector. Also, terrorist finance coordinators
participate in every JTTF. Through TFOS, the FBI has succeeded in building strong working
relationships with all law enforcement and intelligence agencies that are fighting the war on
terror.
15
Evidence Exploitation
Prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI and its partners lacked sufficient procedures for
systematically exploiting paper documents, electronic media, and forensic evidence for its
intelligence value. The National Media Exploitation Center was established in late 2001 to
coordinate FBI, CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National Security Agency
(NSA) efforts to analyze and disseminate information gleaned from millions of pages of paper
documents, electronic media, videotapes, audiotapes, and electronic equipment seized by the
U.S. military and Intelligence Community in Afghanistan and other foreign lands. These
exploitation efforts have produced approximately 20,000 investigative leads, and forensic
evidence such as fingerprints and DNA from documents and items recovered from suspects
overseas have proven critical to a number of terrorist apprehensions and disruptions.
We have since established groups that specialize in the analysis of particular types of information.
On December 4, 2002, we created a Communications Exploitation Section to coordinate the
analysis of documents, electronic media, and forensic evidence, as well as telephone and
electronic communications. Soon thereafter, we established a specialized Document Exploitation
Unit to exploit terrorist-related documentary material and to extract threat and intelligence
information for the FBI and the Intelligence Community. In December 2003, we began
preliminary operations at the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center at the FBI Laboratory
in Quantico, Virginia. This new center, described in more detail on page 45, coordinates the
efforts of multiple federal agencies to collect, analyze, forensically exploit, and disseminate
intelligence related to improvised explosive devices.
Fly-Away/Rapid Deployment Teams
On June 6, 2002, the FBI created the Fly Away/Rapid Deployment Team Unit to manage and
support the field office-based Rapid Deployment Teams and the newly created Headquartersbased
"Fly Squads." These specialized teams and squads lend counterterrorism knowledge
and experience, language capabilities, and intelligence analysis support to FBI field offices
and Legal Attachés whenever they are needed. Since September 11, 2001, the Headquartersbased
Fly Squads have been deployed on 38 different occasions, and have assisted in
operations from Buffalo, New York, to the Gaza Strip.
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force
On October 29, 2001, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive
No. 2, directing the Attorney General to create the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force
(FTTTF) to keep foreign terrorists and their supporters out of the U.S. through entry denial,
removal, or prosecution. FTTTF participants include the FBI, CIA, and the Departments of
Homeland Security, Treasury, State, and Energy. The FTTTF also maintains a close liaison
with intelligence and law enforcement services in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and
other countries. On August 6, 2002, the Attorney General directed the consolidation of the
FTTTF into the FBI.
To fulfill its mission, the FTTTF implemented information sharing agreements among participating
agencies to assist it in locating suspected terrorists and their supporters. It now has access
to over 40 sources of data containing lists of known and suspected foreign terrorists and their
supporters, including the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Offenders File (VGTOF) and the
State Department’s TIPOFF watch list.
16
Relying on this base of information, the FTTTF performs two primary analytical functions:
Tracking and Detection The FTTTF analyzes immigration records, other law enforcement
data, and public and proprietary source information to detect the presence of terrorists in
the U.S. This service supports the activities of JTTFs and other counterterrorism investigators
by helping identify the current and previous locations of suspected terrorists in the U.S.
To date, this process has generated more than 200 leads to the potential location of
terrorists.
Risk Assessment The FTTTF uses human analysis and analytical software to assess
the risk of specific categories of foreign nationals attempting to enter the U.S. In
compliance with the Aviation Transportation and Security Act, the FTTTF also conducts
background records checks and risk assessments on foreign nationals seeking flight
training on aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more. As of December 2003, the FTTTF
has done more than 58,000 such checks. In accordance with the Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, passed on December 12, 2003, we will soon be transferring this
function to the DHS’s Transportation Security Administration.
Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Group
Pursuant to the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002, the
FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division (CJIS) now conducts background
checks and risk assessments on individuals who have or seek access to specific biological
agents and toxins. To meet this new mandate, CJIS established procedures for completing
the assessments, set up a database for tracking the assessments, and reassigned and
hired additional personnel. As of January 26, 2004, assessments were finalized for 7,848
individuals, and 41 were determined to be “restricted persons” as defined by the Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act. “Restricted persons” cannot be allowed by the employing lab to possess,
use, transport, or have access to select agents or toxins.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Unit
In November 2002, we created a specialized unit within the Office of General Counsel to
support and streamline functions related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
process. The new unit coordinates with FBI field offices, FBI Headquarters, and DOJ to ensure
that FISA packages are prepared and reviewed in an expeditious and consistent manner. The
FISA Unit, in coordination with other appropriate Headquarters personnel, is overseeing the
development and implementation of the new FISA management system that will enable us
both to transmit a FISA document between field offices, the operational units at FBI Headquarters,
the Office of General Counsel’s National Security Law Branch, and DOJ’s Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review, and to track its progress during each stage of the review and approval
process. An automated tracking system will identify delays and chokepoints in the process,
and the FISA Unit will remedy identified problems by sending reminders or resolving outstanding
questions.
Language Translation
Connecting Translation Capabilities
The FBI’s approximately 1,200 translators are stationed across 52 field offices and
Headquarters, and are now connected via secure networks that allow a translator in one
17
FBI office to work on projects for any other office. We implemented network enhancements
to ensure that collected intelligence can be transmitted to the appropriate translator on a
near real-time basis, and we developed work flow management software to track, monitor,
and account for any collected data and the corresponding translation product.
Language Services Translation Center
Shortly after September 11, 2001, we established the Language Services Translation
Center (LSTC) at FBI Headquarters to help ensure that translation services are available
whenever and wherever they are needed. The LSTC acts as a “command and control”
center to coordinate translator assignments, and to ensure that our translator resources
are aligned strategically with operational and intelligence priorities. In addition, the LSTC
has an on-site population of 20 FBI translators and 29 contract translators who render
immediate translation assistance to field offices and Legal Attaché offices when required.
National Virtual Translation Center
To provide similar capabilities to the larger Intelligence Community, in accordance with
Section 907 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Director of Central Intelligence established the
National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC) on February 11, 2003, and designated the FBI
as its Executive Agent. Like the FBI’s LSTC, the NVTC serves as a clearinghouse to
provide timely and accurate translation of foreign intelligence for Intelligence Community
agencies. The NVTC taps into the FBI’s pool of contract linguists and matches excess
translation capacity with the translation needs of other Intelligence Community agencies.
The FBI further supports the NVTC by handling recruiting and applicant processing for
NVTC linguists.
Although it will not be fully “virtual” until later this spring, the NVTC has already successfully
completed translation tasks for CIA, DIA, and the FBI. With its Director from NSA, and
its Deputy Directors from CIA and the FBI, the NVTC is truly a Community-wide effort.
Special Technologies and Applications Section
In November 2002, we created a Special Technologies and Applications Section within the
new Cyber Division to support counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal investigations
involving computer intrusions and digital or electronic media evidence. The Section provides
technical investigative analysis, helping to extract and decrypt volumes of data and making it
easily searchable by investigators and intelligence analysts. The Section also designs automated
tools, acts as a clearinghouse for new technologies developed by other agencies and the
private sector, and coordinates with research and development entities inside and outside
government. These efforts help ensure that the FBI is prepared to fully exploit digital evidence
for its intelligence value and to respond to new computer intrusion-related threats and incidents.
18
Investigative Technology Division
Recognizing that the effective and focused use of applied science and engineering resources
is critical to our efforts, especially our efforts to protect the U.S. from a terrorist attack, we
created the Investigative Technology Division (ITD) out of components of the Laboratory
Division in August 2002. The mission of ITD is to develop and provide state-of-the-art technical
support and expertise to enhance the FBI’s investigative efforts. ITD also oversees forensic
services related to the collection and processing of computer, audio, and visual media to ensure
such evidence is fully exploited for its intelligence value.
The ITD develops, procures, and supports technologies which are broadly applicable to all FBI
investigative programs within ITD's designated technology program areas (namely, Electronic
Surveillance, Physical Surveillance, Digital Forensics, Surreptitious Entry, Tactical
Communications, and Defensive Programs).
The refocusing of the FBI's efforts to proactively
address terrorism and foreign intelligence
threats has resulted in a 64 percent increase
in, and a substantial realignment of, ITD’s
workload. This chart depicts the alignment
of the tactical workload of ITD entities in
FY 1996 (historical) and FY 2003 (current).
DISTRIBUTION of
TACTICAL WORKLOAD
Fiscal Year
Grand Total
Criminal
Investigations 48%
Counterintelligence
Counterterrorism
FY 1996 FY 2003
42%
10%
100%
15%
42%
43%
100%
19
CENTRALIZATION
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Bureau had no centralized structure for the national management
of its Counterterrorism Program, and terrorism cases were routinely managed out of individual
field offices. An al-Qa’ida case, for example, might have been run out of the New York Field Office;
a HAMAS case might have been managed by the Washington Field Office. This arrangement
functioned for years, and produced a number of impressive prosecutions.
Once counterterrorism became our overriding priority, however, it became clear that this arrangement
had a number of failings. It “stove-piped” investigative intelligence information among field offices.
It diffused responsibility and accountability between counterterrorism officials at FBI Headquarters
and the SACs who had primary responsibility for the individual terrorism investigations. It allowed
for field offices to assign varying priorities and resource levels to terrorist groups and threats. It
impeded oversight by FBI leadership, and it complicated coordination with other federal agencies
and entities involved in the war against terrorism. For all these reasons, we decided that the
Counterterrorism Program needed centralized leadership.
In December 2001, we reorganized and expanded the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) at
Headquarters and created the position of Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for Counterterrorism
and Counterintelligence. (The Assistant Director of CTD reports to the EAD.) We now have the
centralized management to run a truly national program – to coordinate counterterrorism operations
and intelligence production domestically and overseas; to conduct liaison with other agencies and
governments; and to establish clear lines of accountability for the overall development and success
of our Counterterrorism Program. With this management structure in place, we are driving the
fundamental changes that are necessary to accomplish our counterterrorism mission.
We divided the operations of the Counterterrorism Division into branches, sections, and units,
each of which focuses on a different aspect of the current terrorism threat facing the U.S. These
components are staffed with intelligence analysts and subject matter experts who work closely
with investigators in the field and integrate intelligence across component lines. This integration
allows for real-time responses to threat information and quick communication with decision-makers
and investigators in the field.
20
COUNTERTERRORISM
DIVISION Executive Staff
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
Counterterrorism Division
CT OPERATIONS
DEPUTY AD
CT OPERATIONS
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY AD
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
CT
ADMINISTRATIVE
UNIT
CT BUDGET
COORDINATION AND
SECURITY UNIT
FBI DETAILEES TO
OTHER GOVT.
AGENCIES
Financial
Intelligence
Analysis Unit
Program
Coordination &
Management
Unit
Arabian
Peninsula Unit
Global Extremist/
Financial
Investigations
Unit
Radical
Fundamentalist/
Financial
Investigations
Unit II
National
Joint
Terrorism
Task Force
Fly
Away/RDT
Unit
Military
Liaison &
Detainee
Unit
CT Watch
Unit
Terrorist
Watch &
Warning
Unit
Threat
Monitoring
Unit
Counterterrorism
Analysis
Radical
Fundamentalist
Extremist
Collection,
Evaluation,
Dissemination
Unit
WMD/
Unconventional
Countermeasures
Unit
Radical
Fundamentalist/
Financial
Investigations
Unit I
TERRORIST
SCREENING CENTER
FOREIGN TERRORIST
TASK FORCE
Strategic
Information
& Operations
Center
Reports Policy
and Asset
Vetting Unit
Global ME
Extremist
Collection,
Evaluation,
Dissemination
Unit
WMD
Unconventional
Threat Collection,
Evaluation,
Dissemination
Unit
Domestic
Collection,
Evaluation,
Dissemination
Unit
Communications
Analysis
Unit
Domestic Sunni
Extremist
Analysis Unit
Section
Communication
Exploitation
Section
National
Threat
Center
Section
CT
Operational
Response
Section
Terrorism
Financing
Operations
Section
Terrorism
Reports and
Requirements
Section
International
Terrorism
Operations
Section I
Shia/
Middle East
Analysis Unit
DOCUMENT
Exploitation
Unit
Foreign Links/
Global Targets
Analysis Unit
Domestic
Terrorism
Analysis Unit
WMD and
Emerging
Weapons Unit
Electronic
Communication
Analysis Unit
CT ELSur
Operations
Unit
Unit I
Unit II
Unit III
Unit IV
Regional/
Extraterritorial
Unit
Conus I
Conus II
Conus III
Conus IV
Special
Events
Unit
Section I
Domestic
Terrorism
Operations
International
Terrorism
Operations
Section II
DEPUTY AD
Stand Alone
Global Extremist
Located on all teams
key
Domestic Team
Radical Fundamentalist Team
COUNTERTERRORISM ANALYSIS
DEPUTY AD
Investigative Operations Branch
The Investigative Operations Branch supports, coordinates, and manages terrorism-related
investigations. It is comprised of four sections.
The International Terrorism Operations Section I (ITOS I)
ITOS I supports, coordinates, and provides oversight of FBI international counterterrorism
operations related to al-Qa’ida and other Sunni extremist groups.
The International Terrorism Operations Section II (ITOS II)
ITOS II supports, coordinates, and provides oversight of FBI international counterterrorism
operations related to other groups, such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
as well as the terrorist threat from state sponsors of terrorism.
The Domestic Terrorism Operations Section (DTOS)
DTOS supports, coordinates, and provides oversight of FBI domestic counterterrorism operations.
In addition, DTOS’s Special Events Unit plays a major role in planning, coordinating, and
managing support to field offices charged with counterterrorism responsibilities for special
events such as the Super Bowl or Olympic Games.
The Terrorism Reports and Requirements Section
The Terrorism Reports and Requirements Section oversees the dissemination of raw intelligence
reports and executes policies and procedures established by the Office of Intelligence.
21
Operational Support Branch
The Operational Support Branch handles administrative responsibilities for CTD, and
administers the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, the Terrorist Screening Center, and the
Terrorist Financing Operations Section (all of which are described in detail elsewhere in this report).
This branch also runs two critical components of our counterterrorism operations.
National Threat Center Section
The National Threat Center Section administers CT Watch and other units related to threat
management: 1) the Public Access Center Unit that receives threat information from the public
and forwards it to the appropriate unit; 2) the Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit that produces
finished intelligence products for the law enforcement community (such as Intelligence Bulletins
and Special Event Threat Assessments); and 3) the Threat Monitoring Unit that collects threat
information, looks for patterns and connections, and provides “raw” threat-related intelligence
reports. This Section also runs SIOC, the 24/7 command

хехе
фотографии не проканали
дерьмо тоже не аргумент
теперь нас завалят текстами многостраничными

на месте модеров я бы забанил за оверквоттинг

[Сообщение изменено пользователем 10.07.2008 20:32]

Тут читать - до ночи, стоит ли?

Это фрогу - он тебя всё носом тыкает в отчёт(а их там очень много), а сам его не то что не читал он языка-то не знает.

А вообще-то эти два отчёта выложены для адектватных людей(не для фрога), умеющих правильно читать и правильно сопоставлять отдельные факты.
Дальше в разборе полётов и фотографий эти отчёты могут пригодиться.

[Сообщение изменено пользователем 10.07.2008 20:47]

Не для меня!
Че делать? Как жить? 8(

Вернёмся к снимку предложенному самими американцами для оправдания исчезновения Боинга 757 с массой около 80 - 100 тонн (пояснять их версию не будем так как о ней много говорилось в других темах).

Снимок сделан по-видимому в первый час после тарана этим огромным самолётом этой хилой стены Пентагона.

Посмотрим сами....
.... Больших обрушений стены Пентагона на этом снимке не видно.
На более поздних снимках, которые выдаются как результат удара самолёта в здание, т.е. снимки выдаются за самые ранние - показано как рухнула вся часть этого здания...
(но ведь как оказалось это было намного позднее), при этом намерянно умалчивается разрыв во времени между тараном здания этим просто очень большим по размерам самолётом и временем обрушением самого здания...
Не видно и огромных груд металла внизу под стеной от разрушившегося левого крыла, которые должны были бы упасть после их разрушения прямо вдоль стены, под местом разрушения (на этом снимке отчётливо видны комментарии относительно левого крыла, но не видны груды смятого аллюминиемого лома или чего либо другого из чего это крыло могло было быть изготовлено).
Так же не видно следов керосиновой копоти на стенах в зоне удара левого крыла, которая должна была бы образоваться после удара баков в балку и взрыва образовавшийся в это мгновение керосино воздушной смеси.
Линия удара на снимке приходится на балку, между 1 и 2 этажами(этот снимок должен был доказать что именно эта балка разрушила левое крыло, которое в него ударилось).

Вопросов много.

Ни на один официальная американская пропоганда истории с пентагоном не может привести вразумительные доказательства и объяснения.

Но самое главное - как самолёт обладающий общей массой около 100 тонн, имеющий в баках около двадцати тонн заправки керосина мог вызвать при соударении со стеной на скорости около 800 - 850 км/час столь ничтожные разрушения и пожар, который вы можете наблюдать на этом снимке (... ещё до того момента как к его тушению приступили пожарные расчёты).











[Сообщение изменено пользователем 10.07.2008 23:55]

полная необучаемость
в прочем это доказано на примере размеров боинга
конструкции рухнули через 19 минут после удара

бго, редкостный бред
Сведения доступные любому кто умеет гуглить, ну или на крайняк способен зайти в википедию, оказались недоступны джину тонику.
Это всяко заговор!

Думается мне небыло никакого боинга. Просто какой-нить маленький самолетик или вообще тупо что-нить взорвали.
Больше всего меня смущает то, что ни одна камера видеонаблюдения, ни один прохожий с телефоном, с видеокамерой, не успели заснять летящий на сверхнизкой высоте огромный боинг. Просто вспоминаются: падающий конкорд во Франции, разбившийся в Иркутске самолет, еще чето было.

там рядом аэропорт, в паре километров от Пентагона
поэтому зрелище низколетящего боинга абсолютно привычно местным аборигенам

[Сообщение изменено пользователем 11.07.2008 01:12]

Думается мне, будь там взаправду боинг, фото и видео материала былобы в избытке. Ибо это подтвердило бы офф. версию, а так спецслужбы изъяли все материалы и предлагают нам довольствоваться единственным выложеным кадром с будки у шлагбаума, по которому можно определить нечто, могущее быть например санями Санта Клауса, или крылатой ракетой, или Ивл Канивлом. По мне они более вероятны нежели 757, да вообще любой самолет комплекции боинга.

Обсуждали уже, по этой траектории никогда боинги не летали, единственная полоса для них: 19 и проходит она с севера на юг, паралельно западному фасаду:
Фотография из Фотогалереи на E1.ru

Качественное доказательство отсутствия материалного тела им Боинга 757, только что взлетевшего с того аэродрома - полоса 19, показанного на спутниковом снимке.

Кое что с теми видеоматериалами они промаргали.
Все-таки на них можно реально что-то заметить и определить разницу между размерами Боинга 757 и другим типом летательного аппарата гораздо меньшего по размеру, который и стал причиной взрыва у здания Пентагона.

Но это позднее (в сети на эту тему много осталось следов.... не всё успели изъять агенты американских и других спецслужб по всему миру, хотя последние годы многие материалы просто ичезли, а сайты на которых их выкладывали стали розовые и пушистые, но не все (слишком много этих копий разлетелось по миру - надо только их упорно искать, чтобы найти).

[Сообщение изменено пользователем 11.07.2008 09:15]

а какая разница кто это сделал?

ну соврали всем и сами взорвали, дальше что?

кури дальше
а как проветришся - попробуй для разнообразия связывать слова в предложения так, что в предложении был смысл понятный окружающим

А если бы среди погибших людей в без вести пропавшем Боинге 757 и людей в здании Пентагона были бы ваши родные и близкие вам люди -отец, мать, муж или кто-нибудь из ваших детей.....????
Я так понимаю вам тоже бы было без разницы.

Для того чтобы дальнейшее обсуждение было более понятным требуется познакомиться с девственным видом Пентагона и прилегающей к нему лужайки,
которые существовали ещё за долгие годы до того как в головах каких - то нелюдей, чудовищных монстров родился этот жуткий план с самолётом - террористами -тараном Пентагона,...
который и был реализован 11 сентября 2001 года в этом городе и в этом месте.

На снимке хорошо видны относительно небольшие размеры лужайки и в целом достаточно малые расстояния от здания до ближайшей дороги и столбов уличного освещения.

На большинстве снимков вследствии искажения перспективы у многих складывается впечатление что лужайка перед зданием Пентагона просто огромная.
На деле же это выглядит намного проще.
На этом снимке имеется возможность представить реальный масштаб лужайки перед зданием( в соотношениях...)...
и представить гораздо легче чем по другим фотографиям искажающим реальную перспективу и размеры...


[Сообщение изменено пользователем 11.07.2008 16:22]

а там были ваши близкие?

Вы считаете что невинных людей можно убивать только по той причине что они граждане другой страны?